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Introduction
The issue of whether a bankruptcy judge can sua sponte remove a trustee has rarely been
addressed; however, two courts have recently considered the issue. The Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel in Morgan v. Goldman (In re Morgan), 375 B.R. 838 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007) and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Walden v. Walker (In re Walker), 515 F.3d 1204
(11th Cir. 2008) both concluded that a bankruptcy judge has the ability to remove a trustee “for
cause,” sua sponte, after “notice and a hearing.”
Morgan was the first case to ever deal with the issue of sua sponte removal of a trustee.
In Morgan, the lower court determined without any prior motion by a party that “cause” existed
to remove the trustee due to her conflict of interest. See Morgan v. Goldman (In re Morgan),
375 B.R. 838, 848 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007). The majority opinion of the appellate panel upheld
the lower court judge’s action, briefly stating that a bankruptcy judge has the power to remove a
trustee sua sponte. The concurring in part and dissenting in part opinions in the Morgan case
shed more light on the reasons for and against allowing sua sponte removal.
Walker was only the second, as well as the most recent court to deal with the issue of sua
sponte removal of a trustee. In Walker, the lower court dealt with the issue of whether the debtor
had standing because the debtor made a motion himself to have the trustee removed. Although
Walker had a different procedural background than Morgan, the circuit court in Walker
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ultimately concluded that a trustee could potentially be removed sua sponte as well. Since
Walker held that the court could remove the trustee sua sponte, the standing issue became moot.
There are several implications that come from the holdings of Morgan and Walker.
First, the courts within the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits are now empowered to remove a trustee
whenever “notice and a hearing” are given and “cause” exists. Second, since courts can remove
a trustee sua sponte, the issue of standing is no longer relevant within a trustee removal motion
within the Morgan and Walker jurisdictions. Additionally, since Morgan and Walker are the
only two courts that have dealt with the sua sponte issue, they will likely provide strong
persuasive authority in other jurisdictions.
This paper regarding sua sponte removal of a trustee will be divided into four sections.
First, the statute governing the removal of a trustee will be described. Second, the Morgan case
will be discussed by initially looking at the facts of the case, then turning to the holding of the
court, and finally looking at the dissent of the court. Third, the Walker case will be discussed by
initially looking at the facts of the case, which will be followed the holding of the court. Fourth,
the implications of the Morgan and Walker case will be examined.

Statute
Removal of a trustee is governed by Section 324 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides
that “[t]he court, after notice and a hearing, may remove a trustee. . . for cause.” 11. U.S.C. §
324 (a) (2006). The two elements of this statute most frequently litigated are whether the “notice
and a hearing” are adequate, and whether “cause” exists. The requirements of “notice and a
hearing” are set out in Section 102, which provides for removal “after such notice as is
appropriate in the particular circumstances and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in
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the particular circumstances.” 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). When sufficient notice and an
opportunity for a hearing are not provided, an order removing a trustee can be vacated. See In re
Waller, 331 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2005). Because the Code does not explain what
“cause” means, it is determined on a case-by-case analysis. The most common removal “for
cause” is when a conflict of interest exists between the trustee and another party in the
bankruptcy proceeding, See In re Baker, 38 B.R. 705, 707 (D. Md. 1983), such as when a trustee
is discovered to have formally worked as an attorney and officer for the landlord of the debtor.
See In re Oliveri, 45 F. Supp. 32, 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1933)

Discussion
I. Recent cases deciding sua sponte issue
a) Morgan Case
i) Facts of the Case
In Morgan, the court dealt with the issue of whether a judge may remove a trustee sua
sponte. Morgan involved a trustee, Ms. Jo-Ann Goldman, who was disbursing funds in violation
of an agreement with the debtor. See In re Morgan, 375 B.R. at 844. On March 3, 2003, James
and Linda Morgan filed for chapter 13, thereby creating an amended plan that stated all
disposable income Ms. Goldman received during the first thirty six months of the amended plan
would be paid to the unsecured creditors. See In re Morgan, 375 B.R. at 842 (citing 11 U.S.C. §
1325 (b) (1) (2006)).
A dispute arose over whether a personal injury settlement within the first thirty six
months of the amended plan would be considered disposable income. See id. at 842. Ms.
Goldman eventually made an informal agreement with the Morgans to use the settlement money
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to pay the secured home mortgage lender. See id. Subsequent to the agreement, the court
approved the motion to settle. In compliance with the court order, on May 5, 2005, Ms.
Goldman received the $30,056.03 from the settlement. See id. at 844.
Ms. Goldman’s office did not distribute the settlement funds in accordance with the
agreement Ms. Goldman made with the Morgans. Even though Ms. Goldman agreed to use the
settlement amount to pay the home mortgage lender, Ms. Goldman’s office distributed
$20,056.03 of the settlement to the unsecured creditors. (The remaining $10,000 was given to
the Morgans to repair their roof and car). Ms. Goldman’s office distributed the $20,000 to the
unsecured creditors because that was the normal practices of her office. The Morgans filed an
action against Ms. Goldman because she distributed the settlement funds in violation of the
agreement that the money be used to pay off their home mortgage. See id.
Ms. Goldman gave conflicting testimony at two different hearings regarding the
distribution of the settlement payments. During a hearing on May 10, 2006, Ms. Goldman
admitted she broke her agreement with the Morgans to use the settlement money to pay off the
Morgans’ home mortgage. She further testified that she meant to make a note of this agreement
but forgot. Since Ms. Goldman failed to make a note of her agreement with the Morgans, her
office mistakenly released the funds to the unsecured creditors according to its customary
practice. See id. at 852. However, at a later hearing in November 2006, Ms. Goldman stated that
she did not have an agreement with the Morgans to use the remaining $20,000 from the
settlement to pay off the Morgans’ home mortgage. She further stated that she properly
distributed the funds to the unsecured creditors. See id. at 854.
The lower court upon its own motion stated that a hearing would be held on January 19,
2007, where Ms. Goldman could attempt to justify why she should not be removed as trustee. At
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the January 2007 hearing, the court determined that Ms. Goldman should be removed as trustee
of the Morgans’ estate. The “cause” for Ms. Goldman’s removal was that she had given false
testimony to the court at the November hearing. See id. at 846–47.
ii) Holding and Reasoning of Case
The majority opinion of Morgan found sua sponte removal in the lower court was
appropriate based on statutory interpretation of Section 324 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court
in Morgan noted Section 324 does not provide specifically that a “party in interest” must make a
motion for removal of the trustee. The court held that because the statute does not restrict who
needs to make a motion to remove a trustee, sua sponte removal should be allowed. See In re
Morgan, 375 B.R. at 848.
Chief Judge Kressel’s concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion for Morgan takes
a more in-depth look at why sua sponte removal is appropriate under Section 324. Kressel bases
his viewpoint that Congress deliberately wished to allow sua sponte removal of a trustee by
breaking up the Bankruptcy Code in three different categories. First, there are many provisions
that require a “party in interest” to make a motion as well as “notice and a hearing” to be given.
Next, there are many statutes that require “notice and a hearing”, but do not require a “party in
interest” to make a motion. Last, there are some provisions that require neither “notice and a
hearing” or a request by a “party in interest.” Judge Kressel found that the use of the term “party
in interest” in some provisions means that Congress did not wish for a “party in interest”
requirement to be applied when it was not expressly provided for in the statute. See In re
Morgan, 375 B.R. at 856.
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iii) Dissent
Bankruptcy Judge Mahoney in his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion of
Morgan argues that Section 324 does not allow sua sponte removal of a trustee. Mahoney finds
it problematic that the majority is unable to cite a single case where a trustee under Section 324
is removed without a motion by a third party. See id. at 857. Judge Mahoney also points to
language quoted by the majority opinion in Alexander v. Jensen-Carter (In re Alexander), 289
B.R. 711 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003), which states that “the movant bears the burden of establishing
cause by setting forth specific facts which support such removal.” In re Morgan, 375 B.R. at
857 (quoting In re Alexander, 289 B.R. at 714). Since “movant” is defined as “one who makes a
motion to the court,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (7th ed. 1999), Mahoney argues that use
of the word “movant” assumes that a third party is making a motion. However, Mahoney notes,
sua sponte removal by definition does not have to be brought by a motion by a third party. See
In re Morgan, 375 B.R. at 857. Mahoney further states that when a judge acts sua sponte he
becomes both the “movant” in addition to being the trier of fact. Mahoney asserts this dual role
is improper especially when other procedures could be followed to prevent its occurrence. For
instance, judges could ask the Office of the United States trustee to look into the potential
problem and make a suggestion to the court. See id. at 858.

b) Walker Case
i) Facts of Case
Walker was the second and most recent case to decide the issue of sua sponte removal of
a trustee from a bankruptcy proceeding. Linda J. Walden was elected by creditors to be the
trustee of James F. Walker’s chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Ms. Walden signed a Verified
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Statement stating that she did not have any connections with the creditors in Mr. Walker’s
proceeding besides being the receiver in a connected matter. See Walden v. Walker (In re
Walker), 515 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2008). Later at the Ratification Hearing, Mr. Walker
claimed that Ms. Walden had a connection to creditor Carl Shuhi, who had the second biggest
claim in the proceeding. Ms. Walden denied Mr. Walker’s claims, testifying that she never
received any money from or worked for Mr. Shuhi. See id. at 1207.
On August 23, 2004 Mr. Walker filed a motion to have Ms. Walden removed as trustee.
Mr. Walker alleged that Ms. Walden did accounting work for Mr. Shuhi, produced an expert
report for Mr. Shuhi, and was the registered agent for two of Mr. Shuhi’s businesses. To prove
the relationship between Ms. Walden and Mr. Shuhi, Mr. Walker introduced numerous pieces of
evidence. For example, during the 2000 case, Mr. Shuhi’s attorney testified that Ms. Walden
would be their expert and that he met with Ms. Walden several times in that context. See id. at
1207. Additionally, during two depositions for the 2000 case, Mr. Shuhi testified that Ms.
Walden was his expert for the case. Mr. Shuhi further testified at these depositions that Ms.
Walden was the CPA for his business and was also his personal CPA. See id. at 1208.
On November 17, 2004, the bankruptcy judge held that Ms. Walden did have connections
to Mr. Shuhi prior to Mr. Walker’s bankruptcy proceeding and gave false testimony to the court
that these connections did not exist. Ms. Walden subsequently filed her appeal with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See id. at 1209.
ii) Holding
The circuit court in Walker held that a bankruptcy judge could remove a trustee sua
sponte if cause existed. See id. at 1212. However, this issue was not actually the issue presented
before the court. As stated earlier, the debtor made a motion to have the trustee removed in the
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lower court. See id. at 1207. The actual issue presented to the circuit court was whether the
debtor had standing to make his motion. However, the court held that it did not need to
determine the standing issue since sua sponte power to remove the trustee was granted under
Section 324 of the Bankruptcy Code. Walker based its reasoning for sua sponte removal on the
same statutory interpretation grounds as Morgan. See id. at 1212.1

II. Implications
There are two implications within the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits that come from the
Morgan and Walker holdings. First, courts now have the power to remove a trustee sua sponte,
even though some claim that Section 324 does not authorize sua sponte power. Second, now that
bankruptcy courts can remove a trustee sua sponte there is no longer any benefit for the trustee to
argue the point of standing because the court has the power to bring the issue regardless of an
individual’s standing. Since the standing issue has been removed, the trustee is only left with the
ability to argue whether proper “notice and a hearing” were given and whether “cause” for the
removal actually exists.
In addition to removing the requirement of standing within the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits, the Morgan and Walker holdings may also have an effect on courts in other circuits.
Two circuits have now stated that there can be sua sponte removal of a trustee, while no court
has affirmatively disallowed sua sponte removal, other circuits may follow suit in allowing sua
sponte removal. Individuals may begin to argue in favor of sua sponte removal if a trustee
opposes the motion on standing grounds. Even if an argument is not made in favor of sua sponte
removal, as seen in Walker, a court may still find that sua sponte removal is allowed without a
party ever presenting the issue to the court. Therefore, a trustee in opposition to a motion for
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trustee removal may have to consider whether or not to address why sua sponte removal should
not be allowed when standing is an issue, even if the party making the motion does not make a
sua sponte argument.

1

The circuit court also held that an additional reason to remove Ms. Goldman existed independent from her false
testimony. Ms. Goldman had a conflict of interest in attempting to settle her own liability, while ignoring the
interests of the unsecured creditors. See id. at 855.
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